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Abstract
We study congestion pricing by a government that has redistributive concerns, in the presence of optimal
income taxation. Individuals diﬀer in (unobservable) earning ability and consumption technology for com-
modities using a congestible network (e.g. roads, Internet). We ﬁnd, assuming separable preferences, that
when eﬃciency of consumption technology is either invariant or postively correlated with earning ability, low
ability individuals should face higher marginal congestion charges than high ability ones. Moreover, reducing
congestion (by raising charges or expanding network capacity) enables government to increase redistribution.
We also ﬁnd that means tested congestion pricing may be necessary to implement the second-best allocation.
JEL Code: R41, H23, H21, H41, H54
Keywords: congestion pricing, income taxation, redistribution, infrastructure investment
1 Introduction
Network congestion is becoming an increasingly serious issue, in various domains, from transport networks (e.g.
roads) to telecommunications networks (including the Internet). One of the most commonly suggested remedies
to the problem is the introduction of congestion pricing, which has been the subject of a large number of studies
∗Toulouse School of Economics (antonio.russo@tse-fr.eu). I thank Georges Casamatta, Jean-Marie Lozachmeur, Emmanuel
Thibault and especially Helmuth Cremer for useful comments and suggestions. All errors and opinions expressed are mine alone.
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in the transport and network economics literature.1 Governments and ﬁrms are becoming increasingly receptive
to this idea. In the case of road networks, for instance, we have the example of congestion charging schemes
recently introduced by the cities of London, Stockholm and Milan. Telecom utilities, such as AT&T and Verizon
in the US and BT in the UK, have recently put forward proposals to introduce congestion based pricing for
Internet and data services on their networks, as well as to create a two-tier Internet and email system, where
access to a non-congested portion of the network would be granted only to customers willing to pay a premium,
with the others conﬁned to a congested portion. Congestion pricing si also being considered by providers of
newly installed 4G wireless networks in the face of looming congestion problems in major metropolitan areas in
the US (such as New York City and San Francisco).2
While there is a large consensus among economists on the merits of congestion pricing from an eﬃciency
standpoint, its redistributive implications still seem to be debated.3There certainly are strong concerns among
the public, regulators and policy makers about its possible regressivity. A recurrent argument is that since
goods like transportation and telecommunications represent a higher share of total expenditures for low income
families than for the well oﬀ (even if their consumption is positively correlated with income), an increase in
their price would hurt the former relatively more than the latter (an argument quite similar to one of the
main objections against raising fuel taxes). Moreover, time gains from reduced congestion would be beneﬁcial
mostly to high income individuals, whose opportunity cost of time is supposedly higher. Such concerns were,
for instance, one of the main arguments against the introduction of a congestion tolling scheme for Manhattan
(recently blocked by the New York State Assembly)4, but also in other cities such as Manchester or Edinburgh.
As for telecommunications networks and the Internet, members of the FCC and the Obama Administration in
the US have expressed concerns about the pricing proposals mentioned above, motivated by the will to protect
low income customers, as well as preserving net neutrality.5
1see, e.g, Small and Verhoef (2007) for the case of transport networks. MacKie-Mason and Varian (1995) look at the issue of
pricing for access to the Internet, dedicating signiﬁcant attention to congestion issues.
2See for instance Is 2010 the year of wireless congestion?, MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34634571/ns/technology_and_science-
tech_and_gadgets/
3The literature on equity issues related to road pricing is reviewed in Levinson (2009). He concludes that designing road pricing
schemes such that they have a progressive impact should be possible. A key aspect in this sense is the redistribution of the revenues
they generate. Anyway, he reports a number of contributions that suggest a regressive impact.
4In a recent interview to the New York Times, NY Assemblyman Richard L. Brodsky said he opposed the introduction of
congestion charging in Manhattan for the reason that these schemes put the burden for paying the fees on blueblood and blue
collar alike (see New York Times, Congestion Pricing: Just Another Regressive Tax? www.nytimes.com)
5In a recent interview, FCC member Michael J. Copps stated that so-called 'managed service' and
'paid priority' cannot be allowed to supplant the quality of the public Internet service available to us all
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Governments' intervention to curb network congestion can take diﬀerent forms: they can directly impose
charges or they can regulate utilities providing access to networks (in many cases, they directly own at least
a minority share of these utilities). It is also well known that redistributive concerns may be addressed using
instruments such as income taxes (or transfers). Finally, governments can invest in network capacity to alleviate
congestion. This suggests some interesting questions: how should a government design its optimal ﬁscal and
regulatory policy when it wants to reduce the ineﬃciencies of excessive network congestion and, at the same time,
protect its less fortunate citizens? Can the introduction of congestion charges be justiﬁed on redistributional
grounds (on top of the standard Pigouvian motives), once all the other available instruments are optimally set?
These questions seem relevant in themselves, but more so when we consider that they are closely related to the
issue of political acceptability of pricing measures, which, as testiﬁed by the anecdotal evidence provided above,
is often a crucial obstacle holding back their implementation.
The ﬁrst part of this paper tries to shed light on the issues raised above using a framework quite close to
the well known optimal taxation problem introduced by Mirrlees (1971). We look at congestion charges as part
of a general tax system in which the government uses both income and commodity (nonlinear) taxes6, where
the key aspect is the presence of self selection constraints that limit the amount of redistribution which can be
put in place. This is, to the best of our knowledge, a novel approach in the literature on congestion pricing.
In addition, we also look at the distributional impact of investments in network capacity (such as expanding
network infrastructures, spending on their maintenance or improving traﬃc managment technologies). A crucial
component of our model is that consumption of commodities requires time (as in Becker (1965)), which is a
scarce resource for individuals. Congestion increases the time costs of consuming the commodities (e.g. car trips,
phone calls, data for applications using the Internet...) that, by making use of the network, contribute to its
congestibility. Individuals may diﬀer in both earning ability and consumption technology for such commodities
(both are assumed to be private information). Higher ability in consuming commodities is assumed to reduce,
(www.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2010/12/fcccopps_net_neutrality_requ.html). See also, for instance, the Save the In-
ternet campaign initiative (www.savetheinternet.com). Concerns about preserving net neutrality also revolve around freedom of
provision and transmission of content over the Internet and possible stiﬂing of innovation coming from small ﬁrms or individuals.
While these issues are certainly very important, their study is outside of the scope of this work.
6The nonlinearity assumption is motivated by the information reasonably available to the government. We also take the sim-
plifying assumption that nonlinearities in prices faced by consumers depend only on governmental levies. Alternatively, one could
interpret the problem as that of nonlinear pricing by a public utility providing access to the congestible piece of network, in the
presence of optimal income taxation, as in Cremer and Gahvari (2002). In both cases, the objective of the model is to deﬁne the
optimal pricing policy that a welfare maximising government would choose if it could determine pricing schedules. See Section 2
below for further clariﬁcations on both assumptions.
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for a given level of congestion, the time cost of consumption for the individual (i.e. it means the individual is
endowed with a more eﬃcient consumption technology). The rationale for this assumption is that the amount of
eﬀort (and time) required to use some of the goods we have in mind may vary among individuals: for example,
many Internet applications (even consumer applications such as shopping online or searching for information)
are relatively complex and require cognitive skills that diﬀer across individuals. According to sociological
literature, such diﬀerences are a key contributor to digital inequality (i.e. inequality in ease, eﬀectiveness and
quality of use of digital technologies (DiMaggio et al. (2004)), which is feared to widen existing inequalities as
greater amounts of services and information become digitalised.7Now, cognitive skills may be developed with
education, but are also innate (indeed, they may determine the individual's educational proﬁciency). Moreover,
they are likely to explain a relevant part of an individual's earning ability. It may thus be interesting to consider
also the case in which ability in consuming network commodities is correlated (either positively or negatively)
to earning ability. Such correlation turns out to play an interesting role for the optimal pricing policy, when the
government cares for protecting the less fortunate, as will be shown below.
The results we obtain are the following: ﬁrst, in the presence of optimal income taxes, nonlinear congestion
charges are optimal. Whether the marginal tax rate (or price) faced by low ability individuals should be higher
or lower than that faced by high ability individuals depends on the correlation earning ability and ability in using
the network good. When these are positively correlated or when the latter is invariant in the population, then
low ability individuals should face higher marginal tax rates. When correlation is negative, the opposite may
occur. Second, reducing congestion can help achieve a higher level of redistribution, by letting the government
relax the self selection constraints it faces when trying to redistribute from the more to the less able. The
intuition is as follows: as time spent consuming commodities competes with labour supply and pure leisure for
the individuals' time, reducing it lowers the marginal value of leisure relatively more for those who, at a given
consumption allocation, work more. This is precisely the case of the low ability individuals who would, out of
equilibrium, be mimicked by high ability types. This eﬀect is stronger (resp. weaker) if earning and consumption
ability are positively (negatively) correlated. Therefore, all individuals should face a tax on congestion generating
goods (or activities) not only for Pigouvian reasons, but also because this allows to improve the government's
7Freese et al. (2006), focusing on elderly people, provide evidence of a correlation between cognitive skills and propensity to
use Internet applications. Other evidence underlines the relevance of such skills even among younger individuals (DiMaggio et al.
(2004)).
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redistributive capabilities. This conclusion contrasts with regressivity concerns on congestion charges presented
above. Third, similar considerations apply to investment in network capacity: it is a public good that, by
reducing the overall amount of congestion, aﬀects the government's redistributive ability and should be thus
provided following a modiﬁed Samuleson's rule accounting for this additional eﬀect.8 Again, provision of
capacity has a positive redistributive eﬀect when abilities are positively correlated or the latter is invariant
in the population, while it may be negative when correlation is negative. Fourth, all the mentioned results
are derived assuming separability of goods (including public goods or bads, such as congestion) and leisure in
individuals' utility function and no taste variations across the population. This is important because, according
to all previous literature, such assumptions were supposed to block all redistributive and eﬃciency properties of
commodity taxes on goods responsible for externalities (except for Pigouvian taxes), as long as the government
could tax income optimally. In our model, such properties survive and provide quite clear policy implications,
even under these two assumptions.
Finally, congestion charges may be seen as fees governments ask their citizens to pay in order to ﬁnance the
provision of certain services (for instance, access to a congestible road). Such fees are often subject to means
testing. The second part of the paper is dedicated to the investigation of the question of implementability of the
optimal ﬁscal policy (and allocation of goods and income) without recurring to means tested congestion charges.
In particular, we ask whether the second best allocation derived in the presence of self selction constraints
can be implemented using separable tax functions ( one for income and one for the congestion commodity),
instead of a general tax function conditional on both consumed commodities and income. Means testing would
be necessary if and only if the answer to this question were negative. While, unfortunately, we are not able to
provide analytical conditions answering the question (numerical analysis may be needed and will be developed in
the future-work in progress), we prove that means testing is necessary in the quite important case of quasilinear
preferences.
8This recalls results ﬁrst obtained by Boadway and Keen (1993) and Kreiner and Verdelin (2009).
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Previous literature
The issue of optimal ﬁscal policy in the presence of externalities has been studied quite extensively in the
literature.9 Mayeres and Proost (1997) have studied the design of optimal ﬁscal policy (where the government
can use income and commodity taxes, as well as invest in abatement technologies) in the presence of congestion
externalities.10 The results of their analysis suggest that taxes on congestion generating goods and investment
in congestion abating technologies should not be signiﬁcantly aﬀected by redistributional concerns (Mayeres
and Proost, 1997, Table 2a), at least as long all other instruments are optimally adjusted. However, in their
model the government uses only linear tax schedules. This leaves open the question of whether the positive
redistributive impact of taxing congestion would be found even when the government uses optimal tax schedules
(constrained only by the available information). We provide an answer to this question, which conﬁrms the
ﬁnding of a positive redistributive impact of congestion charges and capacity investment, as part of an optimally
designed tax and spending system. However, given that we allow for nonlinearities, while also recognizing
the asymmetric information problems faced by the government, the redistributive eﬀects of congestion pricing
come from completely diﬀerent sources.11 Cremer et al. (1998, 2001) and Kaplow (2006), studied the role of
environmental levies in the presence of asymmetric information and nonlinear income taxation: however, they
consider a standard model of labour supply where commodities do not require any time of consumption. Their
individuals also have preferences deﬁned over some measure of environmental quality (the amount of pollution,
for instance). In our model, on the contrary, individuals have no taste for congestion in itself, but they suﬀer
from it due to the fact that it increases the time required to consume commodities that make use of the network.
This is the key reason why, contrary to what they ﬁnd, redistributive properties of charges on commodities
generating congestion survive even under separability assumptions.
Recently, Kleven (2004), Boadway and Gahvari (2006) and Gahvari (2007) have looked at the issue of
commodity taxation, in various setups, in light of household production theory ﬁrst introduced by Becker (1965),
9See Bovenberg and Goulder (2002) for a survey.
10Optimal congestion charges in the presence of redistributive concerns were studied also in Leuthold (1976). She ﬁnds that, when
the government cannot redistribute through income taxes and transfers, congestion charges have to be adjusted according to the
welfare weight attached to consumers using the infrastructure: charges will be lower than the Pigouvian ﬁrst best if the congestible
facility is used relatively more by those consumers the government wants to protect.
11Mayeres and Proost's model is more sophisticated than ours on the production side, allowing for ﬁrms using and producing the
congestion aﬀected (and aﬀecting) good. We abstract from these issues.
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showing that standard optimal tax results may have to be modiﬁed.12Our paper is obvously very much related
to these works. However, these papers do not consider the presence of externalities. They also do not allow for
heterogeneous abilities in consuming goods (i.e. consumption technologies) by individuals. Our paper extends
this literature in both directions.
Our results on the optimal provision of network capacity relate to those of Kreiner and Verdelin (2009), who,
in turn, generalized the results of Boadway and Keen (1993). They ﬁnd that, as long as the government can
optimally adjust income taxes, the optimal provision of public goods should follow a modiﬁed Samuleson's rule
suggesting overprovision (underprovision) is optimal if low ability individuals have, at a given allocation, a higher
(lower) marginal valuation for the public good than the high ability ones. In our setup, the ﬁrst case is veriﬁed
since, at a given allocation, low ability individuals value the reduction in the time cost of consuming network
goods (generated by additional network capacity) more than high ability ones, who need to provide less labour.13
Both of these works, diﬀerently from the present paper, are in any case not concerned with externalities and
optimal taxation (or congestion charging) of commodities.
Finally, the paper relates to the literature on nonlinear pricing in the presence of redistributive concerns.
Cremer and Gahvari (2002) considered pricing of public sector goods (such as energy or telecommunications)
and showed that, when the government optimally sets nonlinear income taxes, nonlinear pricing of goods is
optimal. They also show that means testing in pricing of such goods is not necessary. Their results are obtained
under separability assumptions, but in the presence of heterogenous preferences for the public sector good. They
neglect the presence of time costs of consumption as well as congestion externalities. Our results diﬀer from
theirs due essentially to these assumptions.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the model. We present the optimal congestion
charging scheme in Section 3. Section 4 discusses optimal network capacity investments. Section 5 looks at
implementation and means testing. Section 6 concludes.
12An important point of Gahvari's (2007) paper is that standard optimal tax formulae have to be modiﬁed under the assumption
of separability in the utility function among commodities and leisure, but not under separability of commodities and labour supply.
In this paper, we consider only the former case, as is done, for instance, in Boadway and Gahvari (2006) and Kleven (2004).
13Sandmo (1973) studied optimal provision of public goods as intermediate goods that need to be combined with private ones
(such as the individual's time) to produce a given ﬁnal good. He also considers the possibility of a congestible public good. His
approach however abstracts from the need for distortionary taxation to ﬁnance provision and redistribute welfare. Engel et al.
(2009) look at the optimal design of institutions for infrastructure provision and maintenance. We abstract from that issue.
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2 The model
The setup of the model is similar to that of Stiglitz (1982). There are only two types of individuals i = 1, 2.
They diﬀer in (up to) two dimensions: the ﬁrst is earning ability, identiﬁed by the parameter w with
w2 > w1
The second is ability in consuming commodities: this will be illustrated below. For simplicity, the size of both
groups is the same and normalized to one.
There are only two commodities in the economy: composite consumption C (the numeraire) and a network
commodity that makes use of a congestible network D (e.g. car trips along a road, phone calls or data travelling
on a telecom network, such as those of Internet applications). The economy's production technology is linear in
labour for both commodities, with constant marginal costs normalised to one. The production sector is perfectly
competitive so producer prices are equal to unity and constant.14
Individuals are assumed to face the following budget constraint
Ci + qDDi ≤ wiLi + τ i i = 1, 2
where qD the market price of good D (post tax), L is the individual's labour supply and τ is the lump-sum
transfer\tax from the government.
Commodities are also assumed to require some time for consumption. Ability in consuming commodities
(which is assumed to determine the time required to consume them) is the second dimension along which
individuals may diﬀer. It is also assumed to be not observable by the government. We work under two simplifying
assumptions: the ﬁrst is that consumption ability and earning ability are either perfectly correlated (either
positively or negatively). Otherwise, consumption ability is simply homogenous across the population.15 The
14This implies that all nonlinearities in prices faced by consumers for commodities come from nonlinear charges levied by the
government. This is clearly a simpliﬁcation as, for instance, industries such as telecomunications are clearly not perfectly competitive
and ﬁrms, though regulated, do have some pricing power. An alternative interpretation of the model is to consider, as in Cremer
and Gahvari (2002), access to the network as being under the control of a single monopolistic ﬁrm with constant marginal costs that
is either owned by the state or whose prices are set entirely via regulation. Whatever the interpretation chosen, the reader should
keep in mind that the objective of the model is to deﬁne the optimal pricing policy that a welfare maximising government would
choose if it could fully determine pricing schedules through charges or regulation.
15I am working on a version of the model where this assumption is relaxed.
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second is that consumption ability matters only for the consumption of the network good D. In particular,
consuming a unit of commodity D by type i requires aiD i = 1, 2 units of time, while the unit time cost for
consuming C is equal to aC = 0 for both types.16 Individuals thus face the following time constraint
aiDD
i + Li + li ≤ 1 i = 1, 2
where l is leisure (assumed to be pure, no market good is involved in its consumption). We normalize
individuals' time endowment to one (assumed ot be the same for all types). To capture network congestion,
we assume that the time cost of consuming D is in fact an increasing and convex function of the aggregate
consumption of D itself. Therefore
aiD = θ
iϕ(D,K) i = 1, 2
where ∂ϕ∂D ,
∂2ϕ
∂D2 > 0, with D = D
1 + D2, and ∂ϕ∂K < 0. We have θ
1 R θ2 i = 1, 2 depending on whether
earning and consumption ability are respectively positively correlated, negatively correlated or the latter is
simply homogeneous across the population. In the last case, θ1 = θ2 and and a1D = a
2
D = aD for any ϕ.
Increasing network capacity K reduces, for any given total level of consumtpion of D, the amount of conges-
tion. We assume that K has a constant unit cost p. Individuals are assumed to take ϕ as given when deciding
how much of D to consume, which generates the standard congestion externality problem.
Individuals derive utility from consuming the two commodities C and D and leisure. The utility function is
U = U(C,D, l)
increasing in all of its arguments and having standard properties. Since labour supply L = yw and earning ability
w, as well as consumption ability aiD are not observable by the government, while total earned income y is, we
rewrite, as customary in the optimal taxation literature, the individual's utility function in terms of observables,
16The assumption is taken in order to focus on the implications of the presence of time costs of consuming the network good D.
However, it may also be justiﬁed by saying that, contrary to the time required for accessing the congestible network (which is here
modelled as a substitute for labour time, thus a pure waste for the individual) generic consumption requires time that is a substitute
for leisure, which is valuable in itself. Boadway and Gahvari (2006) elaborate on this point.
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saturating the time constraint, as
U i = U(Ci, Di, li) ≡ Ωi(Ci, Di, 1− aiDDi −
yi
wi
) i = 1, 2
The government is able to set nonlinear charges on commodities and income taxes.17It also decides on the level
of network capacity K. Given the cost of production normalisation discussed above, each individual faces a
(possibly type speciﬁc) marginal price pij for commodities given by
pij = 1 + t
i
j i = 1, 2 j = C,D
where tij i = 1, 2 j = C,D is the (possibly type speciﬁc) marginal charge rate imposed by the government on
commodity j.
The government's budget constraint is
∑
i=1,2
(Ii − Ci −Di) ≥ pK +R
We assume the objective of the government is to maximize the following utilitarian social welfare function18
W = U1 + U2
with respect to Ci, Di and yi i = 1, 2, subject to the usual revenue constraint and the self selection constraints.
The government directly chooses allocations of individuals' consumption and income, following the Taxation
Principle (Stiglitz, 1982). We assume that the government wants to redistribute from high to low ability
17This rests on the assumption that personal consumption levels of D can be observed: for the case of road congestion charges,
tolling systems involve, generally, the use of electronic systems allowing to track individual accesses (or at least those of a given
household). In telecommunications, it is almost always the case that personal consumption levels are observable: indeed pricing
schemes for telecom services are often nonlinear. As for C, with two commodities and observable income, if one commodity's
consumption level is observable then the other's must be as well. A version of the model with many commodities (for which
personal consumption levels are not observable) gives the same qualitative results (and is available from the author), though they
would be more diﬃcult to interpret. In the case D is produced by utilities (such as telecommunication services) we assume, as
in Cremer and Gahvari (2002), that there are no information asymmetries between government and utilities about individuals'
consumption levels.
18The assumption of a utilitarian SW function is taken only to minimize the amount of notation but is of no consequence for the
results.
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individuals: therefore, only one self selection constraint will be relevant:
U2 ≥ U21 (1)
where U21 = Ω(C1, D1, 1− a2DD1− I
1
w2 ) is the utility of the only (potentially) mimicking type. The Lagrangean
of the government's problem can thus be written as
L =U1 + U2 + µ
∑
i=1,2
(Ii − Ci −Di)−R− pK
+ λ (U2 − U21)
The FOC of the government's problem are (we omit those with respect to individuals' income y as they are not
the focus of the paper)
∂L
∂C1
= U1C − µ− λU21C = 0 (2)
∂L
∂C2
= U2C − µ+ λU2C = 0 (3)
∂L
∂D1
= U1D −
∂ϕ
∂D
θ1D1Ω1l −
∂ϕ
∂D
θ2D2Ω2l − µ− λU21D + λ
∂ϕ
∂D
θ2D1Ω21l − λ
∂ϕ
∂D
θ2D2Ω2l = 0 (4)
∂L
∂D2
= U2D −
∂ϕ
∂D
θ1D1Ω1l −
∂ϕ
∂D
θ2D2Ω2l − µ+ λU2D + λ
∂ϕ
∂D
θ2D1Ω21l − λ
∂ϕ
∂D
θ2D2Ω2l = 0 (5)
∂L
∂K
= −Ω1l
∂ϕ
∂K
θ1D1 − Ω2l
∂ϕ
∂K
θ2D2 − µp+ λΩ21l
∂ϕ
∂K
θ2D1 − λΩ2l
∂ϕ
∂K
θ2D2 = 0 (6)
where subscripts denote derivatives with respect to either goods or leisure and where the derivatives
U ij ≡ Ωij − aijΩil i = 1, 2 j = C,D
denote the marginal utility individual i = 1, 2 derives from good j = C,D, net of the opportunity cost of the
time required to consume it, taking as given the unit time costs aj (we assume the net marginal utilities to be
always positive for simplicity). Moreover
U il ≡ Ωil i = 1, 2
denotes the marginal utility of pure leisure.
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3 Optimal congestion charges in the presence of redistributive con-
cerns
3.1 Benchmark
Let us start from a benchmark case in which the self selection constraint (1) is not binding, so that λ = 0. In
that case, it is easy to show, starting from the FOC provided above, that optimal commodity marginal tax rates
would be as follows:
tiC = 0 i = 1, 2 t
1
D = t
2
D = τ =
∑
i=1,2
∂ϕ
∂D θ
iDiU
i
l
U iC
that is, if the government does not face binding self selection constraints, as in the ideal case of fully observable
individuals' ability levels, then the only commodity taxes that would be justiﬁed, as long as income taxes are
optimally set, are only Pigouvian taxes. Congestion pricing has no redistributive role in this case.
3.2 Optimal marginal congestion charge rates with binding self selection con-
straints
Following the steps of Cremer et al. (1998) we can, after some manipulations, write the (type speciﬁc) optimal
tax rates tij i = 1, 2 j = C,D (full derivation of the solution to the problem is provided in the Appendix).
PROPOSITION 1: The optimal tax rates tij i = 1, 2 j = C,D write as
tiC = 0 i = 1, 2
t1D =
U1D
U1C
= k1 + τ + δ t2D =
U2D
U2C
= τ + δ
where
k1 ≡ λ
µ
U21C
(
U21D
U21C
− U
1
D
U1C
)
τ ≡
∑
i=1,2
∂ϕ
∂D θ
iDiU
i
l
U iC
δ ≡ λ
µ
∂ϕ
∂D
θ1D1
Ω21C Ω
1
C
U1C
(
Ω1l
Ω1C
− Ω
21
l
Ω21C
θ2
θ1
)
12
We will elaborate below on the interpretation of the three terms. For the moment, observe only that k1 and
δ are incentive terms that are nonzero only as long as the self selection constraint binds (λ > 0). Their role is
to relax such constraint and improve the redistributive capabilities of the government (as long as income taxes
are optimally adjusted, of course).
The term τ is the standard Pigouvian component of the tax formula for the network commodity D (the sum
of the marginal beneﬁts, in terms of reduced opportunity costs of time, of aggregate reduction in consumption of
D). Finally, δ is a term that accounts for the role the reduction in congestion plays in relaxing the self selection
constraint faced by the government (intuition for the role of this term is given below).
Let us now take the following assumption, which is standard in the optimal taxation literature:
ASSUMPTION: Weak separability of preferences between goods and leisure
U i = U(Ci, Di, li) ≡ U
(
Ωi(Ci, Di), φ(1− aDDi − I
i
wi
)
)
i = 1, 2
where both Ω(.) and φ(.) are increasing and concave functions of both of the respective arguments
Under this assumption, we have the following
PROPOSITION 2: Under the above assumption, the components of the optimal tax rates tiD i = 1, 2
write as
k1 =
λ
µU1C
a1DΩ
21
C Ω
1
C
(
φ1l
Ω1C
− φ
21
l
Ω21C
θ2
θ1
)
δ =
λ
µ
∂ϕ
∂D
θ1D1
Ω21C Ω
1
C
U1C
(
φ1l
Ω1C
− φ
21
l
Ω21C
θ2
θ1
)
so that
k1, δ T 0⇐⇒ φ
1
l
Ω1C
T φ
21
l
Ω21C
θ2
θ1
The assumption of separability of preferences between goods and leisure is taken for two reasons: ﬁrst of all, it
allows to identify in a clear way the channels through which (nonlinear) charges on the good using the congestible
network play a redistributive role, even with optimal income taxation in place. Moreover, previous literature
has argued that separability between goods (including public goods and bads, such as congestion in our model)
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and leisure in the utility function blocks, at least with homogeneous preferences and in the presence of optimally
adjusted income taxation, all redistributive properties of taxes on externality generating commodities.19 Our
results go in a diﬀerent direction.
The above results suggest that, when considered as part of a general tax system, nonlinear congestion charges
can help the government improve its ability to redistribute, by relaxing binding self selection constraints. This
happens through two channels. Let us start by the ﬁrst, identiﬁed by the term k1: this is a type-speciﬁc
Atkinson-Stiglitz term accounting for the distortion in the consumption of D, that is optimally introduced
by modifying tax rates for the low ability individuals, in order to make the allocation of goods and income
designed for them less interesting for mimicking high ability types (Stiglitz, 1982). Gahvari (2007), showed that,
in the presence of nonlinear commodity taxes and when consumption of commodities is costly in time terms
(with all individuals having the same consumption technology), such a distortion is called for even if utility is
separable in leisure and commodities. In our model, the term diﬀers from that of Gahvari's given that we allow
for heterogeneous abilities in consuming the network good.20 What we obtain is that this term is surely positive
in the case of either positively correlated earning and consumption abilities or when the latter is the same for
all the population:21 in both cases, a downward distortion in the consumption of D for low ability types is
warranted. Such distortion is likely to be stronger the larger the diﬀerence in consumption abilities (i.e. the
smaller the ratio θ2θ1 ). The sign of the term k1 may be reversed if (and only if) we have a negative correlation
between earning and consumption abilities.
Let us now consider the second channel, identiﬁed by the non-type speciﬁc term δ: congestion charges
discourage (aggregate) consumption of the good D, reduce ϕ and, therefore, the unit time cost aD. This aﬀects
the self selection constraint faced by the government. In particular, the constraint is relaxed in the case of
positive correlation between earning and consumption abilities, or int he simpliﬁed case in which consumption
19See Cremer et al. (1998, 2001) and Kaplow (2006).
20Indeed, if all individuals had the same θ, this term would look exactly like the one presented in Gahvari (2007, Proposition 3).
However, we restrict attention to the case in which consumption of the numeraire C is not costly in time terms, so aC = 0. Gahvari
does not impose such restriction and ﬁnds that the term has a generally ambiguous sign.
21Observe that, under separability, and in both cases mentioned, we surely have
φ1l
Ω1
C
>
φ21l
Ω21
C
at a given allocation of commodities
and income, since the high ability type supplies a lower amount of labour, so that Ω1C = Ω
21
C while φ
1
l > φ
21
l . If high (earning)
ability types also require less time to consume D, then this also contributes to making leisure marginally more valuable to low than
to high ability types (mimickers). Moreover θ2
θ1
< 1 in that case.
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ability is homogenous in the population (in both cases δ > 0).22 The intuition is simple: a high earning ability
individual mimicking an individual of lower ability earns the same income, consumes the same bundle of goods
but (having to work less and, in the case of positively correlated abilities, incurring less time costs in using the
network good) enjoys more leisure than the mimicked; therefore a reduction in the time cost of consuming the
network good (e.g. driving home during rush hours or searching for information over the Internet) is less valuable
to him than it is for the individual whom he mimicks (at a given allocation). A relaxed self selection constraint
allows the government to redistribute additional amounts through income taxes and transfers: redistribution is
more eﬀectively done in a world where the consumption of goods is less costly in time terms. As a consequence,
the non type speciﬁc component τ + δ of the tax rate on D should be set strictly above a standard Pigouvian
tax, for redistributive reasons on top of eﬃciency ones. This contrasts with seemingly widespread beliefs that
congestion charges have a regressive impact on the economy, presented in the introduction.
Notice, however, that the sign of δ may be reversed in the case of negative correlation between earning and
consumption abilities (i.e. if θ2θ1 > 1): in that case, a reduction in the amount of congestion would have an
ambiguous eﬀect: while high earning ability individuals would be working less, they would spend more time
consuming good D (at a given allocation), and this could make their marginal utility of leisure possibly higher
than that of the low ability individuals they want to mimick. Reducing congestion might thus tighten the self
selection constraint and would be undesirable from a redistributive perspective.
Cremer et al. (2001) obtained that reducing environmental damage (here identiﬁed by congestion ϕ) may
have a positive redistributive eﬀect only the latter is a substitute for labour supply. However, they do not provide
any theory explaining why it should be the case. Our paper provides such a theory for the case of congestion
externalities. We think this is a contribution for the following reasons: ﬁrst of all, it is not immediately clear
why the amount of network congestion and labour supply should be complements (or substitutes). Take the
case of roads: congestion, by increasing the time costs of commuting, may indeed be a substitute for labour
supply.23However, while commuting is certainly a very important purpose for car trips and an important con-
tributor to road congestion, evidence suggests that an important portion of trips, even at rush hour, are not
22The explanation follows that of footnote 18 above. In addition, the reduction in congestion is more valuable, at the margin,
to low ability individuals due to the fact that θi enters aiD multiplicatively. If we used other functional forms (for instance, one
in which aiD = θi + ϕ) this particular eﬀect may disappear, but the qualitative result would not change. What is required for the
argument to be valid is that a2D ≤ a1D, for any level of ϕ.
23Several optimal taxation models in the literature are built on that assumption: Parry and Bento (1999) and Calthrop (2001)
assume commuting to be complementary to labour supply
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for commuting, but are related to shopping, visiting relatives or friends, taking kids to school, etc...24 It is
not immediately clear, then, that less road congestion should increase, rather than reduce, the attractiveness of
labour supply compared to other activities. Similar questions arise when one considers congestion on telecom
and data networks: many consumer applications have little to do with labour supply, but look rather comple-
mentary to leisure, such as watching videos, shopping online, playing online games, chatting with friends. The
theory provided here abstracts from any exogenously assumed complementarity (or substitutabilty) between
goods using the network and labour supply or leisure (neither technological nor in preferences): the interaction
we are identifying comes from a diﬀerent source and the substitutability of labour supply and congestion is
endogenous. It comes from the fact that labour and consuming goods are activities that compete with leisure
for the individual's limited time. This also explains why our results predict a redistributive role for reducing
congestion even in the case of separability in preferences between goods and leisure. In fact, in our setup, the
amount of congestion ϕ does not even enter individuals' utility: they have no taste for it. By contrast, in Cremer
et al., if preferences were weakly separable in leisure and goods (including public goods such as environmental
quality), such role would not survive, δ = 0 and Pigouvian taxes would suﬃce (Cremer et al. 2001, Proposition
5). 25
4 Optimal investment in network capacity
In this section, we consider investment in network capacity as an abatement technology enabling the government
to reduce the amount of congestion. The network is modelled as a public good whose provision is measured
in capacity terms. As examples, one may think of investments in new network infrastructures but also in the
maintenance of existing ones, as well as the improvement of traﬃc management technologies. The question
is what criteria should a government caring about redistribution (on top of economic eﬃciency) follow when
24The 1995 NTPS (Figure 12, p.14) for the US reports that only around 37% of all peak hour trips are commuting trips by car.
The 2001 NHTS for the US reports that only around 27% of vehicle miles travelled by car are for commuting purposes (Hu and
Reuscher, 2004, Table 12), while if we restrict attention to rush hour trips the portion is around a half (Small and Verhoef, 2007).
As for average daily person trips, work trips account for around 20% of them (Hu and Reuscher, 2004, Table 11). The National
Travel Survey conducted in 2009 for the UK shows that among total car trips, only 31% are either commuting or business trips,
while 51% are leisure or shopping trips (UK DfT, 2009, Table NTS0401). A survey conducted in London shows that around 60% of
morning peak hour car trips are commuting trips, while for the evening peak hour the ﬁgure is 50% (LRC, 1994).
25Kreiner and Verdelin (2009), in the conclusion to their paper, suggest a redistributive eﬀect of marginal changes in externalities
when the public damage is correlated, for a given income level, with individuals' ability. This is in line with what our results.
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deciding how much to invest in network capacity.26
In order to shed light on the issue, we may start from the FOC (6) of the government's problem. This
expression, after some rearrangements, can be rewritten in the form of a modiﬁed Samuelson's rule (derivations
are provided the Appendix):
PROPOSITION 3: The optimal rule for provision network capacity K is the modiﬁed Samuelson's
rule: ∑
i=1,2
−DiΩ
i
l
U iC
∂ϕ
∂K
+ γ = p
where
γ = −λ
µ
∂ϕ
∂K
D1Ω21C Ω
1
C
U1C
(
Ω1l
Ω1C
− Ω
21
l
Ω21C
θ2
θ1
)
so
γ T 0⇐⇒ Ω
1
l
Ω1C
T θ2
θ1
Ω21l
Ω21C
Now, the ﬁrst term on the left hand side is the sum of the direct marginal beneﬁts of the addition of capacity
in terms of reduction of congestion. In addition, we have the term γ: this accounts for the eﬀect that raising
capacity (when taxes are optimally set) has on relaxing the self selection constraint faced by the government
(notice that γ = 0 if λ = 0 so the standard Samuelson's rule applies if self selection constraints are not binding).
Since the eﬀect of additional capacity is that of reducing the aggregate amount of congestion ϕ, the discussion
for the sign of this term follows the one for the term δ in the above section. When individuals' earning and
ability in making use of the network commodity D are positively correlated or the latter does not vary across
individuals, the sign of the term is surely positive, implying that raising capacity entails an additional extra
social beneﬁt due to the opening up of additional redistributive opportunities. The sign of γ may instead be
negative in the case of a negative correlation among abilities, for the same reasons that explain why the term δ
in Section 3 could be negative in such a case.
These results follow those of Kreiner and Verdelin (2009) who, generalizing those of Boadway and Keen
(1993), obtained a modiﬁed Samuleson's Rule for the provision of a public good (as is network capacity in
26Our formulation considers the network as a public good that has to be combined with individuals' time and money to produce
a given ﬁnal consumption good (D in our case). This is close to Sandmo's (1973) modelling of public goods as intermediate goods
for individual production.
17
our setup), when the marginal willingness to pay for it, at a given allocation, varies with individuals' ability
(and in the presence of optimally adjusted income taxes). In our setup, such variation is due to the fact that
consumption of commodities making use of the network is a costly activity in terms of time (a scarce resource
for the individual) and, as such, competes for it with labour supply and leisure. Higher capacity reduces such
time costs, at least as long as optimal pricing for access is in place, reducing the opportunity cost of additional
labour time, which, at a given allocation, is more valuable to low ability individuals.27
5 Means testing and implementation of optimal congestion pricing
Congestion charges may be seen as user fees to be paid to be granted access to a given piece of infrastructure.
The question we ask in this section is whether congestion charges should be means-tested, like other charges
levied by governments to ﬁnance directly the provision of certain services, and explicitly depend on individuals'
income or not. In order to answer this question, we look to implement the second best allocation using two
separable functions T (I) and P (D) for income and car driving taxation respectively. If this is possible, then
means testing is unnecessary. Otherwise, the government should use a more general tax function τ(D, I) that
depends on both observable income and consumption ofD: in that case, congestion charges should be conditional
on income and means testing would be called for.
The analysis for this part is conducted assuming no correlation between earning and consumption abilities,
so a1D = a
2
D = aD. We retain the separability assumption, so the utility function takes the following form
U(C,D, l) = Ωi(Ci, Di, 1− aDDi − I
i
wi
) = Ω(Ci, Di) + φ(1− aDDi − I
i
wi
) i = 1, 2
h, g and φ are all increasing and concave functions of the respective arguments. We assume, for simplicity, that
aC = 0.
27Indeed, in their conclusions, Kreiner and Verdelin argue that public transportation is likely to beneﬁt, for a given income level,
low ability individuals more than high ability ones, by reducing travel time to and from the workplace, leaving more time for other
activities. The results we obtain develop from essentially the same intuition: however, our results suggest that the purpose for which
the public good is used (whether related to the act of supplying labour or not) is not relevant: what is relevant is that additional
provision reduces the time required to make use of it, for whatever purpose.
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The implementation problem
The government wants to implement the second best allocation
ASB =
(
(I1 − (T 1 + P 1), D1, I1); (I2 − (T 2 + P 2) , D2, I2))
derived in the previous sections, using the separable tax functions T (I) and P (D). T i and P i i = 1, 2 denote
respectively the type speciﬁc payments of income and congestion taxes. Therefore Ci = Ii− (T i+P i) i = 1, 2.
Incentive compatibility calls for types 1 and 2 to choose payments and allocations
(
(T 1, I1); (P 1, D1)
)
and(
(T 2, I2); (P 2, D2)
)
respectively. However, when individuals face separable tax functions, they have additional
possibilities to deviate from the allocation intended for them: for instance, they may choose to consume a
quantity of commodity D intended for the other type, while choosing the amount of income intended for their
type. Or they could choose to mimick the other's type income, while consuming the right amount of D. This
implies that, in order to be implementable in separable tax functions, the second best allocation ASB has to
respect seven incentive constraints (i.e. the standard global IC constraint (1) and six additional incentive
constraints ensuring domination of partial mimicking strategies). We present the constraints in the Appendix.
Results
In the Appendix, we prove that all of the above constraints are surely satisﬁed at the second best allocation ASB ,
except the constraint ensuring no partial mimicking on income by type 2 individuals. So we can say that if and
only if that constraint is veriﬁed, then ASB is implementable with separable tax functions, and means testing is
not necessary. Unfortunately, it is diﬃcult to identify analytical conditions ensuring that the constraint whether
it will be the case or not. The issue can be analysed numerically (work in progress). However, we are able to
establish that the constraint will surely fail in a particular but quite interesting case, that of quasilinearity of
U(.). We summarize the results in the following Proposition:
PROPOSITION 4: Assume that the government wanted to implement the second best allocation ASB
with separable tax functions T (I) and P (D). Then:
• A necessary and suﬃcient conditon for ASB to be implementable in separable functions is
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that it satisﬁes the PMI2 constraint.
• The constraint is surely not satisﬁed if U(.) = C+g(D)+φ(l), i.e. preferences are separable
and quasilinear. In that case, then, means testing is necessary
6 Conclusion
This paper has considered the problem of optimal congestion pricing for access to a public network in the
presence of optimal income taxation, when the government has redistributive concerns and faces self selection
constraints. We consider this a novel approach in the study of congestion pricing, which may contribute to
the still open debate on the redistributive implications of such measures. The model also extends previous
literature on optimal taxation by modelling congestion as deteriorating individuals' consumption technology
(i.e. increasing the time required for consumption) of commodities making use of the network and allowing for
heterogeneities in individuals' consumption technologies (which may capture, for instance, relevant issues such as
digital inequalities that may be relevant in determining individuals' ease and eﬀectiveness in using digitalised
services and information provided through the Internet).
The results we obtain are the following: ﬁrst, in the presence of optimally set income taxes, nonlinear
congestion charges are optimal. Whether the marginal tax rate (or price) faced by low ability individuals should
be higher or lower than that faced by high ability individuals depends on the correlation between earning ability
and ability in using the network good. When these are positively correlated or when the latter is undiﬀerentiated
across the population, then low ability individuals should face higher marginal tax rates. When correlation is
negative, the opposite may occur. Second, reducing congestion can help achieve a higher level of redistribution,
by letting the government relax the self selection constraints it faces. This eﬀect is stronger (resp. weaker) if
earning and consumption ability are positively (negatively) correlated. Therefore, all individuals should face
a tax on congestion generating goods (or activities) not only for Pigouvian reasons, but also to improve the
government's redistributive capabilities. This conclusion contrasts with regressivity concerns on congestion
charges that seem to be quite persistent among policy makers and the public. This indication may be even more
cogent in the presence of a positive correlation between earning ability and ability in making use of network
goods, such as Internet services: this is interesting because it suggests that if, as seems likely, more skilled
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individuals have both higher earning ability and are better suited to exploit network goods and services, then
consumption of such goods for low ability individuals should, perhaps counterintuitively, be distorted even more
in order to increase the amount of redistribution that can be put in place. Moreover, in that case, reducing
network congestion, either by raising congestion charges or by investing in additional network capacity, has an
even stronger eﬀect in increasing the government's redistributive capabilities. Both such measures would be
even more desirable from a social welfare perspective.
Finally, we have considered the problem of implementing the optimal (second best) allocation with separable
tax functions forcommodities using the network (and contributing to congestion) and income. If such feat is
feasible, then it means that the optimal allocation can be achieved without making use of means tested congestion
charges. Our results suggest that means tested congestion charges may be necessary, for instance in the case of
quasilinear preferences. Numerical analysis is however needed to investigate the issue in more depth.
Our model is very simple: we have considered a discrete, two-type model of the economy (though our
results would generalize to n-types setups), with only two goods. We believe, however, that the results would
generalize to environments with multiple types and goods. We have also considered individuals diﬀering only in
earning and consumption ability, disregarding diﬀerences in tastes. Moreover, our results rest on two important
assumptions: the ﬁrst is that the government is able to fully determine the pricing schedule for the goods
using the network, which may not always be the case in reality. However, one should interpret the results as
indicative of what a welfare maximising government should do when being interested in both curbing excessive
congestion and protecting the less fortunate, if it faced no constraint (except self selection) in implementing the
optimal allocation. The second important assumption is that the government is able to adjust, when introducing
congestion pricing, the income tax in an optimal way. This may not always be the case, for instance, with multiple
levels of government involved in setting charges and income taxes. Relaxing these assumptions looks like an
interesting and challenging path for future research.
References
[1] Atkinson A. and Stiglitz J. (1976), The Design of Tax Structure: Direct versus Indirect Taxation. Journal
of Public Economics 6 (1976): 5575.
21
[2] Becker G. (1965) A theory of the allocation of time, Economic Journal 75, 493517
[3] Boadway R. and Gahvari F. (2006), Optimal taxation with consumption time as a leisure or labor substitute,
Journal of Public Economics 90, 18511878
[4] Boadway R. and Keen M. (1993), Public goods, self selection and optimal income taxation, International
Economic Review 34, 463-478
[5] Bovenberg L. and Goulder L. (2002), Environmental taxation and regulation. in A. J. Auerbach & M.
Feldstein (ed.) Handbook of Public Economics, chapter 23, 1471-1545.
[6] Calthrop E. (2001), On subsidizing auto commuting. CESIfo Working paper N.566
[7] Cremer H., Gahvari F. and Ladoux N. (2001), Second best pollution taxes and the structure of preferences,
Southern Economic Journal, 68-2, 258-280
[8] Cremer H., Gahvari F. and Ladoux N. (1998), Externalities and optimal taxation, Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 70, 343-364
[9] Cremer H. and Gahvari F. (2002), Nonlinear pricing, redistribution and optimal tax policy, Journal of
Public Economic Theory, 4 (2), pp. 139-161
[10] Department for Transport UK (2009), National Travel Survey.
[11] DiMaggio P., Hargittai E., Celeste C. and Shafer S. (2004), Digital Inequality: from unequal access to
diﬀerentiated use. In K. M. Neckerman (ed.) Social Inequality. Russel Sage. New York.
[12] Engel E., Fischer R. and Galetovic A. (2009), On the eﬃcient provision of roads. Working Paper, Yale
University
[13] Freese J., Rivas S. and Hargittai E. (2006), Cognitive ability and Internet use among older adults. Poetics,
Volume 34, Issues 4-5, Pages 219-318 (August-October 2006)
[14] Gahvari F.(2007), On optimal commodity taxes when consumption is time consuming, Journal of Public
Economic Theory, 9, 1-27
22
[15] Hu P.S. and Reuscher T. (2004), Summary of travel trends, the 2001 National Household Travel Survey,
US Department of Transportation
[16] Kaplow L. (2006), Optimal control of externalities in the presence of income taxation. Harvard Law School
Discussion Paper n. 547
[17] Kleven H. J. (2004), Optimum taxation and the allocation of time, Journal of Public Economics, 88, 545-557
[18] Kreiner C. T. and Verdelin N. (2009), Optimal provision of public goods: a synthesis, forthcoming in The
Scandinavian Journal of Economics
[19] Leuthold J. H. (1796), The optimal congestion charge when equity matters, Economica, 43, 77-82
[20] Levinson D.(2009), Equity Eﬀects of Road Pricing: A Review. Transport Reviews. 30(1) 33-57
[21] London Research Center (1994), Travel in London: London Area Traﬃc Survey 1991. HMSO, London.
[22] MacKie-Mason J.K. and Varian H.R. (1995), Pricing the Internet in B.Kahin & J.Keller, eds, Public
Access to the Internet, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliﬀs.
[23] Mayeres I. and Proost S. (1997), Optimal Tax and Public Investment Rules for Congestion Type of Exter-
nalities, Scandinavian journal of economics, Vol. 99, No. 2 (Jun., 1997), pp. 261-279
[24] Sandmo A. (1973), Public goods and the technology of consumption, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 40,
N. 4, pp. 517-528
[25] Parry I. (2008), Pricing Urban Congestion. Resources for the Future Discussion Paper N. 08-35.
[26] Parry I. and Bento A. (1999), Revenue Recycling and the Welfare Eﬀects of Road Pricing. Scandinavian
Journal of Economics
[27] Small K. and Verhoef E. (2007), The economics of urban transportation. Routledge.
[28] Stiglitz J.E. (1982), Self-selection and Pareto eﬃcient taxation, Journal of Public Economics, 17, 213-40
23
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 and 2
Start from the FOC (2)-(5) and rearrange to get to
U1D
U1C
=
1 + λµU
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∂D θiDiU
i
l
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)
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multiplying both sides by 1 + λµU
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C and rearranging we get
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Similarly, we get
U2D
U2C
= 1 +
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We now set out to derive the terms τ and δ that we identify in the tax formulas above: rewrite
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now, using the FOC (2) we have
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so that we can rewrite
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ﬁnally, replacing the above expression in (7) we have
U1D
U1C
= 1− λ
µ
U21C
(
U1D
U1C
− U
21
D
U21C
)
+ τ +
λ ∂ϕ∂D θ1D1
µ
U21C
(
U1l
U1C
− U
21
l
U21C
θ2
θ1
)
and
U2D
U2C
= 1 + τ +
λ ∂ϕ∂D θ1D1
µ
U21C
(
U1l
U1C
− U
21
l
U21C
θ2
θ1
)
where
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is the Pigouvian term as described in the text. Up to now, we have essentially followed the derivations in Cremer
et al. (2001). It now only remains to use the fact that
U ij ≡ Ωij − ajΩil i = 1, 2 j = C,D
and
U il = Ω
i
l i = 1, 2
to be able to write, after some rearrangements,
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the sign of this term is not immediately determined. Assuming that aC = 0 yields however
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which is the deﬁnition of the term δ given in the text.
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We now focus on rewriting the term k1 in the tax formula for the individual of type 1. We have
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which, after some rearrangements, can be written as
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Up to now, we have not used the separability assumption. Let us assume indeed that preferences are separable
as in the ASSUMPTION in the text. Then
Ω1C
Ω1D
=
Ω21C
Ω21D
so that the expression above gives
λ
µU1C
[
a1DΩ
1
CΩ
21
C
(
Ω1l
Ω1C
− Ω
21
l
Ω21C
θ2
θ1
)
+ aCΩ1DΩ
21
D
(
Ω21l
Ω21D
− Ω
1
l
Ω1D
)
+ aC
(
a2D − a1D
)
Ω21l Ω
1
l
]
now, using aC = 0, we obtain that the expression above simpliﬁes to
λ
µU1C
[
a1DΩ
1
CΩ
21
C
(
Ω1l
Ω1C
− Ω
21
l
Ω21C
θ2
θ1
)]
which is the expression for the term k1 in the text.
Proof of Proposition 3
To derive the modiﬁed Samuleson's rule presented in the text, start from the FOC (6) and add and substract
to the left hand side the following
λ
∂ϕ
∂K
D1U
21
C
U1l
U1C
so that (6) can be rewritten as
− (U1C − λU21C )( ∂ϕ∂KD1 U1lU1C θ1
)
+(1 + λ)U2C
(
− ∂ϕ
∂K
θ2D2
U2l
U2C
)
+λU21C
(
∂ϕ
∂K
D1
U21l
U21C
θ2 − ∂ϕ
∂K
D1
U1l
U1C
θ1
)
−µp = 0
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now, using expressions (2)-(3)we can rewrite the above as
−µ
(
∂ϕ
∂K
D1
U1l
U1C
θ1
)
+ µ
(
− ∂ϕ
∂K
D2
U2l
U2C
θ2
)
+ λU21C
(
∂ϕ
∂K
D1
U21l
U21C
θ2 − ∂ϕ
∂K
D1
U1l
U1C
θ1
)
− µp = 0
which can ﬁnally be rewritten as
∑
i=1,2
−DiΩ
i
lθi
U iC
∂ϕ
∂K
− λ
µ
∂ϕ
∂K
D1U21C
(
U1l
U1C
θ1 − U
21
l
U21C
θ2
)
= p
now, we can rewrite the second term on the right hand side as
−λ
µ
∂ϕ
∂K
D1U21C
(
U1l
U1C
θ1 − U
21
l
U21C
θ2
)
= −λ
µ
∂ϕ
∂K
D1
U1C
(
θ1U
1
l Ω
21
C − aCθ1Ω21l Ω1l + θ2Ω21l aCΩ1l − θ2Ω21l aCΩ1C
)
=
= −λ
µ
∂ϕ
∂K
D1
U1C
Ω21C Ω
1
C
((
φ1l
Ω1C
− φ
21
l
Ω21C
θ2
θ1
)
+ ac
Ω21l Ω
1
l
Ω21C Ω
1
C
(
1− θ2
θ1
))
ﬁnally using aC = 0, we obtain that the expression above simpliﬁes to
−λ
µ
∂ϕ
∂K
D1
U1C
Ω21C Ω
1
C
(
φ1l
Ω1C
− φ
21
l
Ω21C
θ2
θ1
)
which is the term γ presented in the text. The modiﬁed Samuelson's rule obtains as presented in the text then.
Proof of Proposition 4
We deﬁne P 1 = r1 and P 2 = P 1 + r2 the payments the consumer has to make to consume the quantities D1
and D2 respectively, such that he is indiﬀerent (given he has choosen the right post-tax income level) between
choosing the quantity of D intended for him and the one intended for the lower ability individual (or none at
all if he is type 1). In particular, r1 is such that
Ω(I1 − T 1 − P 1, D1) + φ(1− aDD1 − I
1
w1
) = Ω(I1 − T 1, 0) + φ(1− I
1
w1
) (8)
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and r2 is such that
Ω(I2 − T 2 − P 2, D2) + φ(1− aDD2 − I
2
w2
) = Ω(I2 − T 2 − P 1, D1) + φ(1− aDD1 − I
2
w2
) (9)
We then take the following assumptions:
Assumptions:
• D2 > D1
• r2 > 0
• I2 > I1
• I2 − T 2 > I1 − T 1
The constraints
The seven constraint the SB allocation ASB will have to satisfy in order for implementability in separable tax
functions to be feasible are the following
• Global IC
Ω(I2 − T 2 − P 2, D2) + φ(1− aDD2 − I
2
w2
) ≥ Ω(I1 − T 1 − P 1, D1) + φ(1− aDD1 − I
1
w2
) (10)
which holds, by assumption, at equality in the second best allocation ASB , given that it is binding.
• Participation type 2:
Ω(I2 − T 2 − P 2, D2) + φ(1− aDD2 − I
2
w2
) ≥ Ω(I2 − T 2, 0) + φ(1− I
2
w2
) (11)
this constraint ensures that individuals of type 2 will consume the intended quantity D2 rather than not
consume any D at all.
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• Participation type 1:
Ω(I1 − T 1 − P 1, D1) + φ(1− aDD1 − I
1
w1
) ≥ Ω(I1 − T 1, 0) + φ(1− I
1
w1
) (12)
same as the above constraint, for individuals of type 1.
• Partial mimicking on I, type 2:
Ω(I2 − T 2 − P 2, D2) + φ(1− aDD2 − I
2
w2
) ≥ Ω(I1 − T 1 − P 2, D2) + φ(1− aDD2 − I
1
w2
) (13)
• Partial mimicking on I, type 1:
Ω(I1 − T 1 − P 1, D1) + φ(1− aDD1 − I
1
w1
) ≥ Ω(I2 − T 2 − P 1, D1) + φ(1− aDD1 − I
2
w1
) (14)
• Partial mimicking on D, type 2:
Ω(I2 − T 2 − P 2, D2) + φ(1− aDD2 − I
2
w2
) ≥ Ω(I2 − T 2 − P 1, D1) + φ(1− aDD1 − I
2
w2
) (15)
• Partial mimicking on D, type 1:
Ω(I1 − T 1 − P 1, D1) + φ(1− aDD1 − I
1
w1
) ≥ Ω(I1 − T 1 − P 2, D2) + φ(1− aDD2 − I
1
w1
) (16)
Simpliﬁcation of the problem: By deﬁnition of r1 and r2 the constraints (15) and (12) are satisﬁed at
equality at the second best allocation ASB . We can then prove that also (11) is surely satisﬁed, at least as long
as functions Ω and φ satisfy standard Inada conditions. We can also prove that (15) implies (14). Finally, we can
prove that (13) implies (16). (Proof of all these results is available upon request). Therefore, the only relevant
constraint to be veriﬁed is (13): that the constraint is satisﬁed at ASB is therefore a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for implementability of ASB with separable tax functions.
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Validity of (13) at ASB We know that
Ω(I2 − T 2 − P 2, D2) + φ(1− aDD2 − I
2
w2
) = Ω(I1 − T 1 − P 1, D1) + φ(1− aDD1 − I
1
w2
) (17)
at ASB . Therefore, (13) can be rewritten as
Ω(I1 − T 1 − P 1, D1) + φ(1− aDD1 − I
1
w2
) ≥ Ω(I1 − T 1 − P 2, D2) + φ(1− aDD2 − I
1
w2
) (18)
assume, to simplify the problem further, that the utility function is of the form
f(C) + g(D) + φ(l)
with all subfunctions being increasing and (nonstrictly) concave in their respective arguments. Constraint (18)
rewrites as
f(I1 − T 1 − P 1)− f(I1 − T 1 − P 2) ≥ g(D2)− g(D1) + φ(1− aDD2 − I
1
w2
)− φ(1− aDD1 − I
1
w2
)
now, using the partial mimicking on D for type 2 (15) we have that
g(D2)− g(D1) = f(I2 − T 2 − P 1)− f(I2 − T 2 − P 2) + φ(1− aDD1 − I
2
w2
)− φ(1− aDD2 − I
2
w2
)
which replaced in the constraint above, allows us to rewrite (18) as
(
f(I2 − T 2 − P 2)− f(I1 − T 1 − P 2))− (f(I2 − T 2 − P 1)− f(I1 − T 1 − P 1)) ≥ (19)(
φ(1− aDD1 − I
2
w2
)− φ(1− aDD2 − I
2
w2
)
)
−
+
(
φ(1− aDD2 − I
1
w2
)φ(1− aDD1 − I
1
w2
)− φ(1− aDD2 − I
1
w2
)
)
now, by concavity of both f(.) and φ(.), both sides of the equality are positive. One can, however, make the
observation that the left hand side is likely to be larger than the right hand side if f(.) is strongly concave (i.e.
30
there are strong income eﬀects) compared to φ(.), and viceversa. Indeed, we prove below that in the case income
eﬀects are absent, i.e. if f(.) is linear and preferences are quasilinear, the constraint (19) is surely not veriﬁed.
Proof that (13) ia not valid at ASB if preferences are quasilinear
Start from the constraint rewritten in the form (19) as done above. Assume f(C) = αC α > 0. We obtain
that the left hand side is equal to zero, evidently. Given that, by concavity of φ(.), the right hand side of (19)
is strictly positive, then the inequality cannot be veriﬁed. (13) cannot hold.
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